War and Conflict Journal

While the war itself is not yet over, several points can be examined in how this conflict unfolded and the early course of the war, as well as some apparent consequences of this Russia-Georgia war:

–It now appears clear that Georgia was duped into attacking South Ossetia and that the Russians had laid a trap to make the Georgians fire the first shots, thereby letting Russia claim to be pushing back an aggressor. According to Stratfor, a private American intelligence company, Russian forces were pre-positioned near the border, therefore more able to respond quickly to attack the Georgians when they moved into South Ossetia on August 8. While the timing of the Georgian attack took the Russians by surprise, their inability to seize the South Ossetian capital and thus their delay in pushing on to the strategically important Roki Tunnel, allowed Russia to pour troops into Ossetia and force back the Georgian military.

–The early Russian bombing campaign was critical to Russia’s rout of the Georgian military. Russia has obviously learned from other recent conflicts, including the Kosovo War, their own Chechen Wars, and the American Wars against Iraq in the 1990s as well as the current Iraq War. In those conflicts, swift and overpowering use of air power against enemy military facilities, air bases, and transportation and logistical targets disrupted the defender’s plans and enabled the invading forces a powerful advantage.

–Georgia assumed that because of their cooperation with America in Iraq, and their application to join NATO, America would be more proactive in helping Georgia against Russia. This appears to have been foolish and naive wishful thinking. With major American military assets tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with a possible Iran War looming, the United States is in no position to risk war with Russia.

–Poland, which suffered from Russian invasions, massacres, and depredations multiple times in the 20th century, came to a quick agreement with the United States that will place an American missile defense base in Poland. This long-delayed agreement was reached by the Americans and Poles in an obvious response to what the Poles see as Russian aggression in Georgia.

–President George W. Bush, while eager to force democratic change in relatively weak Iraq and Afghanistan, is clearly not eager to defend a more-or-less existing democratic regime, as in Georgia, against an obvious (and relatively powerful) non-democratic aggressor.

–A corollary to the above statement is that America is dangerously overextended through numerous global commitments (not all of these commitments are wars) that limit the America’s ability to respond to new conflicts and challenges as they occur.  Case in point, even if the U.S. were willing to place American ground forces in harm’s way, even as a blocking force, they would not be able to assert themselves with any numbers or resources due to the Iraq and Afghan wars, as well as other commitments in Korea, Kosovo, and elsewhere.

–Most likely, Iran, North Korea, China, and other possible future aggressors are likely taking notes on America’s apparent fear of engaging in a possible conflict with a powerful nation, even to defend a close ally. 

–America’s smaller and more vulnerable allies should also pay attention to this abandonment of an American ally and fear the potential threats on the horizon and the likely American response, or non-response.  Taiwan should update their scenarios of a Communist Chinese attack and decide what to do if President Bush (or his successor) help them the same way he is aiding Georgia.

For regularly updated information on the ongoing war between Russia and Georgia, visit: The Georgia-Russia War at Historyguy.com