War and Conflict Journal

While the war itself is not yet over, several points can be examined in how this conflict unfolded and the early course of the war, as well as some apparent consequences of this Russia-Georgia war:

–It now appears clear that Georgia was duped into attacking South Ossetia and that the Russians had laid a trap to make the Georgians fire the first shots, thereby letting Russia claim to be pushing back an aggressor. According to Stratfor, a private American intelligence company, Russian forces were pre-positioned near the border, therefore more able to respond quickly to attack the Georgians when they moved into South Ossetia on August 8. While the timing of the Georgian attack took the Russians by surprise, their inability to seize the South Ossetian capital and thus their delay in pushing on to the strategically important Roki Tunnel, allowed Russia to pour troops into Ossetia and force back the Georgian military.

–The early Russian bombing campaign was critical to Russia’s rout of the Georgian military. Russia has obviously learned from other recent conflicts, including the Kosovo War, their own Chechen Wars, and the American Wars against Iraq in the 1990s as well as the current Iraq War. In those conflicts, swift and overpowering use of air power against enemy military facilities, air bases, and transportation and logistical targets disrupted the defender’s plans and enabled the invading forces a powerful advantage.

–Georgia assumed that because of their cooperation with America in Iraq, and their application to join NATO, America would be more proactive in helping Georgia against Russia. This appears to have been foolish and naive wishful thinking. With major American military assets tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with a possible Iran War looming, the United States is in no position to risk war with Russia.

–Poland, which suffered from Russian invasions, massacres, and depredations multiple times in the 20th century, came to a quick agreement with the United States that will place an American missile defense base in Poland. This long-delayed agreement was reached by the Americans and Poles in an obvious response to what the Poles see as Russian aggression in Georgia.

–President George W. Bush, while eager to force democratic change in relatively weak Iraq and Afghanistan, is clearly not eager to defend a more-or-less existing democratic regime, as in Georgia, against an obvious (and relatively powerful) non-democratic aggressor.

–A corollary to the above statement is that America is dangerously overextended through numerous global commitments (not all of these commitments are wars) that limit the America’s ability to respond to new conflicts and challenges as they occur.  Case in point, even if the U.S. were willing to place American ground forces in harm’s way, even as a blocking force, they would not be able to assert themselves with any numbers or resources due to the Iraq and Afghan wars, as well as other commitments in Korea, Kosovo, and elsewhere.

–Most likely, Iran, North Korea, China, and other possible future aggressors are likely taking notes on America’s apparent fear of engaging in a possible conflict with a powerful nation, even to defend a close ally. 

–America’s smaller and more vulnerable allies should also pay attention to this abandonment of an American ally and fear the potential threats on the horizon and the likely American response, or non-response.  Taiwan should update their scenarios of a Communist Chinese attack and decide what to do if President Bush (or his successor) help them the same way he is aiding Georgia.

For regularly updated information on the ongoing war between Russia and Georgia, visit: The Georgia-Russia War at Historyguy.com

The United States increased its public criticism of Russia on Sunday, August 10, as the Russians and their Abkhazian proxies opened a second front in their war against the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. As the U.S. Air Force ferried Georgia’s Iraq contingent back home, American political and national security officials made some possibly disturbing public comments about possible American involvement in the Georgia-Russia War:

"[Vice-President Dick] Cheney was even more pointed, telling [Georgian President] Saakashvili on Sunday afternoon that "Russian aggression must not go unanswered," according to his press secretary.

Briefing reporters traveling with Bush on Sunday, Deputy National Security Adviser James F. Jeffrey would not rule out the use of American force to assist Georgia but said that was not the current focus of U.S. efforts. "–Washington Post, August 10, 2008

An interesting, and very important point here, is that a top American National Security official, James Jeffrey, said the U.S. would not "rule out the use of American force…" in aiding Georgia. If this were any other nation in that part of the world, this would be a credible threat, but realistically, what can the U.S. do short of sending a few thousand Marines or an Airborne brigade into harm’s way? If the Russians drive on the Georgian capital of Tbilisi, the U.S. could send in troops to act as a trip-wire, (i.e. this means playing a deadly game of "chicken" with the Russians in their own backyard), daring them to attack what would at first be a thin screen of American troops likely blocking the approaches to the Georgian capital. With a lot of our military resources tied up in ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where would we get the troops to help the Georgians? Air power? Again, unless the Turks let the U.S. fly out of Incirlik air base in Turkey, or at least grant overfly rights for from American bases in Iraq, how would we get to Georgia? And could the U.S. realistically achieve air superiority over Georgia? Russia has bases much nearer the war zone, and would not have the logistical issues the U.S. would face. On the other hand, every time American-made warplanes engaged Soviet and Russian-made warplanes over the skies of Indochina or in the various Arab-Israeli wars, the Russian-made products fared badly. Though it is probably safe to assume that Russian pilots are better trained and more skilled than Syrian or Vietnamese pilots of those past wars.

Whatever planning is going on in the Pentagon and at the White House, (and you know many American military and strategic professionals are pulling all-nighters preparing for the possibility of American intervention in the Georgia-Russia War, they had best look at this realistically. Miscalculations of enemy intent and capabilities have started some very big wars in the past.

For regularly updated information on the ongoing war between Russia and Georgia, visit: The Georgia-Russia War at Historyguy.com

By August 10, Russian air power continued to dominate the skies above Georgia, with bombing of the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. Also, the war expanded to the naval front, with the Russian navy deploying warships off the Georgian coast. The Kremlin asserted that Russian forces sank a Georgian missile boat that attempted to attack Russian naval forces off the Black Sea coast. The Georgians said that Russian tanks had invaded Georgia proper, having moved south out of Ossetia into Georgian territory.

The Ukraine, where the Russian ships are based, said that it had the right to deny re-docking privileges to the ships upon their return. Ukraine, like Georgia, has sought to move away from Russian influence and seek to join NATO. Also on the 10th, American military transport aircraft began ferrying Georgia’s Iraq contingent back home to face the invading Russians.

Russian and Abkhazian troops moved into the Georgian-contolled Kodori Gorge on on August 10, in a major expansion of the war.

For regularly updated information on the ongoing war between Russia and Georgia, visit: The Georgia-Russia War at Historyguy.com

Sources and Links:

Georgia under all-out attack in breakaway Abkhazia: Separatist rebels and Russian forces launch attack on Georgian stronghold in Black Sea territory–Guardian.co.uk, August 10, 2008

Russia expands Georgia blitz, deploys ships–Associated Press, August 10, 2008